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Abstract 
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade 
union facilitating nonbinding communication among workers, raises wages by 
simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the 
bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
A widely accepted fact about trade unions (TUs) is that, by centralizing workers’ 
bargaining strategies, they cause wages to rise.5 However, despite unionization, in 
many markets, decentralized bargaining takes place because individual workers 
aim at personal rather than collective objectives or due to lack of coordination 
among different TUs.  
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5 The trade unions with sufficient membership strength are able to bargain more effectively 
with the management than individual workmen (Justice Ahmadi, in B.R. Singh v. Union of 
India). For a rigorous rent- sharing approach to wage determination under collective 
bargaining, see Christofides and Oswald (1992).  
In this context, a TU may have two opposite effects on market efficiency. 
First, by collectively setting a minimum acceptable wage, the TU toughens 
workers’ attitude in decentralized negotiations. In that case, ex post (after wage 
offers are observed) rejection of a broader range of low wages reduces worker 
participation and market efficiency because some mutually beneficial employee-
employer transactions do not take place. Second, the TU may cause employers’ 
wage offers to rise in anticipation to a tougher attitude by workers. The ex ante rise 
of employers’ offers will tend to enhance worker participation and, thus, market 
efficiency. However, the overall effect resulting from the interplay of these two 
effects has not been addressed so far, probably because real-world data are not 
informative on the bargaining process preceding observed wages.  
Labor market experiments6 offer information on both employees’ and 
employers’ strategies. Specifically, since its implementation in the seminal 
experiment by Güth et al. (1982), ultimatum bargaining constitutes a laboratory 
analogue of real-world transactions with take-it-or leave-it offers. While cheap talk 
messages from proposers to responders7 and vice versa8 have been studied in the 
context of ultimatum experiments, communication among respondents has not 
been studied so far. We undertake this task9, using the analogy between non 
binding communication among respondents and a cheap talk TU providing a 
coordination device for workers engaging in decentralized transactions.                      
2. Experimental design and results 
The results reported here were obtained from three paper-and-pencil sessions with 
90 subjects, recruited among economics students at the University of Cyprus. At 
the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned the role of an 
employer or a worker. Common written instructions were distributed to them.10 
They were not informed on the duration of the session. All sessions were stopped 
after period 15. In each period, an employer writes a wage offer X€, which may 
be any amount between 0€ and 10€, in steps of 0.1€. A worker, who is randomly 
chosen to be matched11 with the employer in this period receives the offer and 
accepts or rejects it. In the case of acceptance, the worker earns X€ and the 
employer earns 10-X€. Otherwise, they both earn nothing. Subjects were paid 
                                                 
6 On the use of labor market experiments, see Falk and Fehr (2003). 
7 Rankin (2003). 
8 Andersson et al. (2008). 
9 Berninghaus et al. (2003) experimentally compare collective and individual bargaining, 
considering collective players with perfect control over coordinated individuals’ strategies. 
10 Instructions translated from Greek and decision-feedback sheets are available upon 
request from the authors. 
11 Random employer-worker pairs were formed within 5 or 6 independent matching groups 
per session. 
according to their earnings in five periods which were randomly chosen at the 
end of the session, yielding an average payment slightly below 17.5€ per subject.     
In session 112, which is used as the baseline, there was no TU. Sessions 213 
and 314 started in the same way as session 1. However, before period 7, subjects 
received new written instructions informing them that workers would exit the room 
and freely talk for 10 minutes. An experimentalist showed workers the way to 
another room which was isolated from the main session. Secrecy was guaranteed 
concerning the content of the communication among workers. In the meantime, 
another organizer made sure that no communication could take place among 
employers. After the union meeting ended, the experiment went on, keeping 
player roles and matching groups fixed.  
Table 1 presents averages of proposed and accepted wages, earnings by 
subject type and the percentage of accepted offers. Overall, baseline offers 
approximately reproduce the usual 60%-40% split of the pie in favor of proposers. 
Thus, as pointed out in García-Gallego et al. (2008), the labor market framing 
adopted here produces similar results to those usually obtained from the abstract 
setup.15 From the information contained in the table, we state a number of results 
which organize our statistical analysis and discussion.   
 
   Wage 
offers  
Wages  Employe
r 
earnings  
Worker 
earning
s 
% of 
acceptanc
es 
Without TU  3.95  4.37  3.66  2.84 65% 
With TU  4.45  4.74  3.63  3.28 69%  
Overall sample  4.16  4.53  3.65  3.02 67%  
Table 1: Averages of offers, wages and earnings and acceptance frequencies.  
RESULT 1: The TU increases wage offers. 
We check first whether the effect of the TU on employers’ offers appears 
before or after employees’ post-union reaction to past wage offers is observed. 
                                                 
12 28 subjects in 4 matching groups of 4 and 2 groups of 6 subjects each. 
13 32 subjects, in 2 groups of 4 and 4 groups of 6. 
14 30 subjects, in 5 groups of 6 subjects each. 
15 A plethora of factors affecting behavior in ultimatum experiments, are discussed in 
Bearden’s (2001) thorough review. 
That is, whether wage offers increase ex ante, because the TU affects employers’ 
beliefs concerning workers’ minimum acceptable wage, or whether employers 
raise their offers ex post, after having observed workers’ post-union behavior. We 
compare matching group averages using a Wilcoxon test. In session 2, there is a 
statistically significant difference in offers across periods 6 and 7 (p=0.03). In session 
3, there is no significant ex ante effect on employers’ offers (p=0.34). However, 
comparison between pre- and post-TU periods in session 3, shows that offers are 
significantly higher in the presence of a TU than in the absence of it (p=0.07). On 
the contrary, the ex ante reaction of employers to the union meeting in session 2 
does not lead to a persistent increase of offers with respect to pre-union levels 
(p=0.24). Offers in periods 7-15 significantly vary across sessions 1 and 2 (Mann 
Whitney, p=0.05), which also supports result 1. In order to guarantee that the 
differences in offers across pre- and post-union sub-sessions are not due to other 
dynamics like for example learning, we have also tested and rejected the 
existence of any similar differences across the corresponding sub-sessions in 
session 1.16  
RESULT 2: The TU increases wages. 
 Mostly, the tests performed here reproduce the patterns obtained from the 
tests on result 1. Specifically, while wages in session 2 vary significantly from period 
6 to period 7 (p=0.09), pooling together pre- and post-TU data, yields no significant 
difference (p=0.52). Similar to the results reported on wage offers, in session 3, 
wages are significantly higher in periods 7-15 than in periods 1-6 (p=0.07), whereas 
there is no difference between periods 6 and 7 (p=0.68). Pooling together data 
from periods 7-15 in sessions 2 and 3, we find that wages in the presence of a TU 
are significantly higher than in the absence of it (Mann Whitney test, p=0.04). The 
lack of significant differences across sub-sessions 1-6 and 7-15 of session 1 shows 
that the wage differences across pre- and post-union sub-sessions should not be 
attributed to learning or other dynamics.17 
RESULT 3: The TU has a moderately positive effect on workers’ earnings, leaving 
employers’ earnings unaffected.  
We have tested for differences in workers’ and employers’ earnings across 
pre- and post-union periods. Apart from a subject’s share of the pie from 
successful negotiations, this variable includes zero earnings due to rejected offers. 
                                                 
16 The significance of differences in offers across early (1-6) and late period (7-15) sub-
sessions is rejected by a Wilcoxon test (p=0.46). The significance of differences between 
periods 6 and 7 is also rejected (p=0.60).  
17 The significance of wage differences across periods 6 and 7 is rejected by a Wilcoxon 
test (p=0.50). The significance of wage differences across early (1-6) and late period (7-15) 
sub-sessions is also rejected (p=0.46). 
Taking matching group averages as independent observations and comparing 
pre- and post-union data, we find that the TU does not significantly change 
employers’ earnings (Mann Whitney test, p=0.81), whereas the increase in 
employees’ earnings fails by a small margin to pass the 10% significance threshold 
(p=0.11). 
RESULT 4: The TU reduces workers’ willingness to accept a given wage, whereas the 
percentage of accepted offers is moderately increased.  
The two parts of result 4 may seem to contradict each other. However, an 
acceptance or rejection decision must be analyzed with respect to the wage 
offered in the first place. We do this by estimating a Probit model, in which the 
dependent variable takes the value 1 for acceptances and the value 0 for 
rejections. In table 2, the significance of the union dummy coefficient (p<0.05) 
implies that the TU reduces the probability of acceptance of a given offer. We 
find, also, that female workers are more likely to accept a given wage. Finally, 
session effects are non-significant. Interestingly, the negative effect of the union 
on acceptance probabilities does not translate into a lower percentage of overall 
acceptances. On the contrary, acceptances moderately rise from 65% to 69%. 
   
Acceptance Coeff 
Standard 
error 
   
Offer       0.94*** 0.08 
TU    -0.35** 0.14 
Female W       0.50*** 0.12 
S2                0.19 0.16 
S3              - 0.09 0.16 
Constant       3.57*** 0.35 
Pseudo R2                0.245  
Table 2:  Probit results for the probability of an acceptance. Offer: wage offers, TU: dummy 
for data in the presence of a TU, Female W: dummy taking the value 1 if the worker is 
female, S2, S3: dummies for session 2 and 3 data. Significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
3. Conclusions 
We report results from an ultimatum bargaining experiment showing that a cheap 
talk trade union facilitating verbal non binding communication among workers 
raises employers’ wage offers and observed wages without causing any efficiency 
loss. In our experiment, the union increases wages by simultaneously raising 
employers’ offers and employees’ likelihood of rejecting them. The overall effect 
on market efficiency has been positive because, ex post, workers accepted a 
higher percentage of the offers they received.  
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